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   A student of comparative negotiating behavior once stated that if Americans are at one 
end of the spectrum, the Japanese are surely at the other end.' This paper is an attempt to 
describe, analyze, and explain Japanese negotiating behavior, particularly its psychological 
underpinnings. I will first present some characteristic features of Japanese negotiating 
behavior, primarily in the business sphere, and the rather negative Western perceptions or 
stereotypes of that behavior. I will then try to find some explanations of that behavior in 
terms of Japanese social realities and psychological phenomena. Moving to the diplomatic 
arena, I shall review some concepts that are said to underlie Japan's foreign relations, 
particularly its difficult relationship with the United States, and offer a personal contrasting 
view. The writers who deal with such phenomena in the field of negotiating behavior or 
foreign relations generally present behavioral characteristics without trying to explain why the 
Japanese do what they do. The paper will end with some speculative, and probably 
controversial, ideas on why the Japanese seem to exhibit thought and action patterns that are 
different from those in the West, and often also different from those in China.2 
Japanese Business Negotiating Style 
   Before we get into the Japanese negotiaiong style, a few words about Japanese 
communication style are in order. Dr. Alan Goldman, an American professor of communication, 
has written a handy guide, entitled For Japanese Only: Intercultural Communication with 
Americans. He presents three approaches of communication: the A (for American)-type, the J 
(for Japanese)-type, and the Z-type ("a combination of the American and Japanese ways of 
communicating, tailored and prepared for Japanese"). In his J-type Communication List he 
describes 111 observations from No. 1, "Formality in speaking, gestures, and facial 
expression," to No. 111, "Japanese value group spirit in organizations." I might also mention 
"A non-argumentative communicative style," "Communication style that somewhat conceals 
emotions," "Prefers an agenda, rather than free-form interaction," "May be unfamiliar with 
turn-taking in conversations," "Japanese communicators seem to leave much `unsaid,' implied, 
or understated," "Japanese often engage in selfdepreciation," and "Japanese most often do not 
prefer to engage in conceptual debates, attacks, and disputes with strangers."3 
   Robert March in his book, The Japanese Negotiator. Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western
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Logic, lists the following as salient aspects of Japanese domestic negotiation style: intuition, 
indirectness, disguising or suppressing real feelings, persistence, avoidance of self-praise, 
patient dissembling, and diligent information-gathering about the other sides' needs or 
intentions. 4 
   To this list we can add, in no particular order:5 decisionmaking by consensus (ringi 
kessai); preparing the consensus (nemawashi, or tying the roots before transplantation); a desire 
that the result allows each side to win something; stressing areas of agreement; compromise; 
avoiding social conflict; avoiding rejection or refusal of a proposal; awareness of feelings and 
emotions; avoidance of complaining; avoidance of direct bargaining; indirection leads to 
ineffectiveness of logical presentations; tatemae-honne (appearance and real intent); omote-ura 
(front and reality); saving face as the key to successful interactions; maintaining harmony 
(wa); implicit communication necessitating careful listening (versus explicit communication on 
the Western side); telepathy or communication without words (Ishin-Denshin); silences (the 
need to watch body language); the need to be very patient; the indirect approach leads to the 
need for experienced go-betweens; the use of intermediaries for introductions (Shokai-sha) and 
during negotiations (Chukai-sha); limited authority of negotiators (similar to the old Soviet or 
Communist negotiators,6 but in contrast to Western negotiators); long introductory sessions or 
courtesy calls to get to know the negotiator on the other side; discussing long-term 
generalized goals first; building long-term relationships; building trust; adaptability; 
concessions are holistic (rather than sequential). 
   Professor March notes that Western perception is that the Japanese way is merely 
perverse: "Obliqueness, avoidance, disdain for frankness, a refined tendency to call things by 
other names seem mere contrariness for its own sake." 7 But a look at the characteristic 
features of the Japanese society, particularly those that affect the negotiating behavior and 
foreign relations, will help us understand that the Western perceptions or stereotypes are 
exaggerated or plain wrong. Dr. Michael Blaker, the first scholar to focus on the Japanese 
international negotiating style, likewise came to the conclusion that the materials examined in 
his exhaustive study of Japanese negotiation techniques did "not support the image of 
Japanese diplomats as devious and underhanded," and that "[t]his popular stereotype seems 
both unwarranted and undeserved."8 
Japanese Cultural Characteristics 
   In my courses on Japanese politics and foreign policy, 1 have always included one or two 
lectures on the socio-cultural background of the Japanese society, and stressed the following 
aspects:9 
   (1) insularity, isolation, homogeneity, national self-consciousness; (2) the tradition of 
adopt and adapt; (3) group identity and "we-they" mentality, fear of social rejection; (4) 
hierarchical structures and vertical society, oyabun-kobun (parent-child, boss-underling) 
relationship; (5) the value of harmony and consensus, conformity and emotion; (6) the 
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distinction between form and content, appearance and reality (tatemae-honne); (7) dependency 
and amae; (8) shame and guilt cultures, ambivalence; (9) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, two 
aspects of the Japanese personality? (10) feelings of vulnerability and insecurity, anxiety and 
tension; (11) affluence and poor-man mentality; (12) feelings of victimization (higaisha ishiki), 
"goatability" (scapegoating) and Japan-bashing, orphan Japan; (13) dependency and amae 
expectations; arrogance and "counter-amae" psychology. 
   Any discussion of Japanese social characteristics would be incomplete without reference 
to the morals teachings (Shushin) that all Japanese had studied in schools until Japan's defeat 
and educational reforms initiated by the American Occupation.1° One sees the importance of 
the spirit of harmony (wa) and the "Cultivation of spirit of benevolence." The "Shame" aspect 
of Japanese culture is clearly seen in the last injunction to honor one's obligations "to parents 
and Emperor and avoid bringing shame to them." 
   Dr. Mamoru Iga, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at California State University, 
Northridge, compares Japanese and American value orientations in his book, The Thorn in the 
Chrysanthemum." Dr. Iga stresses Japanese monism (compared to American dualism), groupism 
(compared to American individualism), accomodationism; and authoritarian familism (versus 
American egalitarianism). 
   Professor John W. Connor12 has developed a list of comparisons of traditional Japanese 
and American values that highlight Japanese socio-cultural characteristics. Of these values, 
the following are relevant to our discussion of Japanese negotiating behavior: reliance on the 
group; emphasis on hierarchy; emphasis on duty; dependency needs; achievement of goals set 
by others; emphasis on self-effacement; responsibility to others; deference and politeness; 
success through self-discipline and will power; and an emphasis on compromise, precise rules 
of conduct, and a "situational ethic." 
   It should also be noted that the social critic Yamamoto Shichihei has characterized 
Japanese culture as "a culture of negotiation" (hanashiai), rather than "a culture of contract" 
(keiyaku). Contract "presupposes a commitment to some abstract (long-lasting) principle, while 
n`egotiation' presupposes a greater concern with the immediate interaction, to which the ego 
adjusts for tension reduction or for short-range problem solving."13 
   I consider the following to be the most important Japanese characteristics. We should 
start with the notion that group orientation, rather than individualism, is paramount in Japan. 14 
As for group dynamism, it is important to note that hierarchical structure is prevalent, as it 
was in Confucian China. A well-known scholarly work on Japanese society is entitled 
"Vertical Society. 1115 Japanese language and speech patterns provide further proof of 
hierarchical social relationships. For example, the Japanese distinguish between giving to or 
receiving from a person of higher or lower rank or social status in relationship to the speaker, 
and the Japanese (and in this case also the Chinese) have separate words for older and 
younger brothers or sisters. Within this hierarchical society, values and relationships that 
seem to predominate (perhaps because of the insularity, crowded environment, and 
homogeneity of the population) are "harmony" (wa), 16 "civil formality" (tatemae), and
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dependency (amae). 
   The last concept was articulated in the mid-1950s by the eminent psychoanalyst Dr. Doi 
Takeo.'7 He proposed that amae was a key concept for understanding Japanese personality 
structure. Amae feeling is "to depend and presume upon another's benevolence." It is the 
feelings that all normal infants have toward the mother: dependence, the desire to be passively 
loved, the unwillingness to be separated from the warm mother-child circle and cast into a 
world of objective "reality." Put another way, amae is a dependency need which manifests 
itself in a longing to merge with others. This longing can be fulfilled under normal conditions 
in infancy, but it cannot be easily satisfied as one grows up. Yet the need for amae continues, 
and it is argued that this search for amae beyond infancy manifests itself in a variety of social 
conventions and characteristics. 
   Dr. Doi followed his amae research, with a book-length study of tatemae and honne. Earlier 
I have described these two Japanese words to mean "appearance and reality." Dr. Doi's 
formulation is somewhat different and importantly he also ties tatemae to group harmony (wa). 
      Tatemae is a certain formal principle which is palatable to everybody concerned so 
  that the harmony of a group is guaranteed, while honne is the feelings or opinions which 
  they privately hold regarding the matter. 18 (emphasis added) 
   Dr. Doi argues that when the Japanese use tatemae, there is no intent to deceive. He does 
bring in the expression "Devil-mask, Buddha-mind (kimen busshin). But one can also imagine 
the reverse, "Buddha-mask, Devil-mind." Mitsuru Inuta has written of his countrymen's 
"tendenc
y to disguise their real intentions beneath an agreeable, smiling appearance 
(tatemae)."19 Thus, while Dr. Doi may be right about the lack of deception in the in-group, I 
would venture the thought that his observation may not necessarily be true of relationships 
(and negotiations) with out-groups. In other words, what is not permissible in the group and is 
generally not practiced (whether in the family, the company, or the nation) may be acceptable 
behavior when dealing with persons outside the group. 
   Amae, wa and tatemae lead to other characteristics, namely politeness, indirectness, 
avoidance of conflict, the use of intermediaries, silent pauses in conversation, and the 
ambiguity of the Japanese language - all of them very important for the negotiating process. 
   Above all, one should heed Professor J. V. Neustupny's injunction not to "search for a 
simple explanation of Japan through a single principle." He points to a number of explanatory 
concepts that "claim the power to explain the whole lot or at least large bundles of features of 
Japanese society: amae, vertical society, Zen, tatemae and honne, oyabun-kobun relationship, 
group harmony, and many others."20 
   Twenty years after his articulation of the importance of amae, Dr. Doi linked it to the 
Japanese patterns of communication. He posited that "all interpersonal communications in 
Japanese society have the emotional undertone of amae, " and that many short breaks in 
Japanese conversation can be explained as feeling out one another and assessing the situation. 
He concluded that "what is most important for Japanese is to reassure themselves on every 
occasion of a mutuality based upon amae.21 Dr. Doi also talks about the ambiguity of the
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Japanese language, and the fact how little the Japanese communicate in international 
conferences. The ambiquity of the Japanese language is legendary. Lack of precision is, of 
course, wonderful for poetry, when a thought can trail off into nothingness, but it is not 
desirable for legal contracts. Is that one of the reasons why the Japanese prefer oral 
agreements to formal contracts? Let me quote again Dr. Doi: 
      Japanese communication is usually quite loose in logical connections. You can go on 
   talking for hours, even gracefully, without coming to the point. That is why it is 
   sometimes extremely difficult to render a Japanese speech or article into English.22 
   Let me finish this brief survey of Japanese cultural characteristics by mentioning the 
Japanese reluctance to say "No" (a form of indirectness in communications as well as a desire 
not to offend). In Japan one simply does not say "no," for that would be too direct, abrupt, and 
ultimately impolite. Keiko Ueda has compiled a list of sixteen ways the Japanese avoid 
saying "no":23 vague "no"; vague and ambiguous "yes" or "no"; silence; counter                                                                           question; 
tangential responses; exiting (leaving); lying (equivocation or making an excuse - sickness, 
previous obligation, etc.); criticizing the question itself; refusing the question; conditional 
"no"
; "Yes, but. . ."; delaying answers (e.g., "We will write you a letter"); internally "yes," 
externally "no"; internally "no," externally "yes"; apology; the equivalent of the English "no" 
- primarily used in filling out forms, not in conversation. I think she has missed the most 
common way one avoids saying "no" in Japan: one simply says that "it would be difficult" 
(muzukashii desu ne ...), in essence a code word for "no." 
   What do all these traits have in common? Just as in the case of amae, the civil formality 
of tatemae also performs useful social functions. My feeling is that in a crowded society one 
has to maintain a certain civility. Perhaps there is fear that blurting out one's true feelings 
would lead to disharmony, and all hell would break loose. Perhaps the imprecision of the 
Japanese language is related to the use of tatemae to promote harmony in the group. Would 
direct, explicit speech endanger the cohesiveness of the group? And, finally, would not body 
language, and the use of frequent silent pauses instead of speech be safer in a group situation? 
In other words, one can speculate that all of this may be connected to the fear of the 
environment. 
Japanese Diplomatic Style 
   Many Japanese observers take it to be virtually axiomatic that there is a basic 
incompatibility between American and Japanese negotiators. This naturally extends to the 
field of diplomacy. The noted Japanese political scientist Mushakoji Kinhide believes that 
this basic incompatibility derives from a fundamental philosophical difference in views about 
the relationship between humans and their environment. He juxtaposes the American erabi 
style and the Japanese awase style. The American style (choosing, can-do, or "manipulative") 
is grounded in the belief that "man can freely manipulate his environment for his own 
purposes." The Japanese style ("adaptive") "rejects the idea that man can manipulate the 
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environment and assumes instead that he adjusts himself to it."24 From this Japanese attitude 
follow appeals to past obligation and requests for present favor (shades of amae, see below). 
My own interpretation of the Japanese acceptance of the environment is that it stems from 
vulnerabilities caused by frequent natural disasters. 
   Are the Japanese poor diplomats? Some Western scholars have commented on the 
negative aspects of Japanese diplomatic practice. Blaker characterized the Japanese approach 
as "Probe, Push, and Panic."25 Professor Robert Friedheim writes that 
      The behavior of Japanese negotiators ... is difficult for an outsider to understand. To 
  some, it is inexplicable in that Japanese representatives seemed to follow strategy and 
  tactics that were most likely to produce an outcome that would be unsatisfactory to her 
  negotiators, and perhaps to her interests.26 
   In discussing the "instinctive," or village/feudal, Japanese approach, Professor Gregory 
Clark lists some positive aspects, but points to diplomacy as an area where it works badly.27 
Dr. Doi echoes Dr. Clark's negative view of Japanese diplomacy: 
     I think this attitude of the Japanese [toward ambivalence] very much affects their 
  relationships with foreigners. If they show their ambivalence to each other, they will 
  naturally manifest it even more toward foreigners, in turn inviting foreigners' ambivalence. 
  The upshot of all this is that they may not really be liked by foreigners in spite of an 
  ardent desire to be liked. This, incidentally, explains the rather poor performance by Japanese in 
  international diplomacy. In particular, they do not seem to be able to exert leadership in the 
  arena of international politics. But how can they when they have the same problem in 
  domestic politics?28 (emphasis added) 
   As diplomat Kitamura Hiroshi has noted in his perceptive monograph on the 
"Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations," the amae psychology plays a very 
important role in formulating Japanese psychological attitudes in international relations. He 
posits the pervasive Japanese sense of "an unbalanced relationship" with the United States, 
which fits with the general "sense of hierarchy," which I have discussed above. He feels that 
certain Japanese psychological traits and national characteristics have become so intertwined 
with this "relationship of unevenness" as to pose major psychological problems. The "sense of 
hierarchy," according to Mr. Kitamura, produces (a) "respect and awe," (b) "feeling of being 
victimized," and (c) "placing on a pedestal" and "disillusionment." He then proceeds to amae 
psychology and argues that the Japanese feel that because the United States is more powerful 
than Japan, it should - to a certain extent - indulge them: "The unbalanced relationship 
between Japan and the United States ... is highly conducive to initiating an amae 
psychology."29 Having lost the war, Japan had to depend heavily on American "benevolence" 
in almost all phases of national survival. This, according to Kitamura, has led to "unrealistic" 
and "take-it-for-granted" attitudes, which in turn have led to "frustrated" and "hostile" attitudes 
when the American behavior in negotiations did not gratify or satisfy the Japanese desire for 
amae. 
    In a study of U.S.-Japanese relations, Professor Sato Hideo points to misperceptions 
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rooted in cultural differences. He brings special attention to consensus, amae and sincerity, 
haragei (nonverbal) bargaining, and form versus substance.3o 
   Another senior Japanese diplomat Ogura Kazuo, in his monograph, Trade Conflict: A View 
from Japan, stresses the dependency theme: 
      As U.S. criticism of Japan's bilateral trade surpluses has grown stronger in recent 
  years, there has been a parallel rise in Japanese charges that the United States does not 
  understand Japan. While these charges do contain a good deal of truth, they also spring in 
  part from the Japanese feeling that since Japan is willing to play the inferior "younger 
  brother" role with the United States, the United States, as an "older brother," should 
  understand Japan and be more sympathetic to and protective of Japanese interests.31 
   I think that in discussing amae relationships, it is important to consider the power 
relationship between individuals, groups, or nations. How do the Japanese feel in the mid-
1990s, fifty years after the defeat in World War II, now that the power relationship between 
Japan and the United States has changed and in some areas shifted in Japan's favor? In the 
economic sphere, one measure would be total GNP, where Japan's total product in the early 
1950s was 1/26 of the U.S. GNP, compared to 3/4 (or higher, depending on the value of the 
yen in relationship to the U.S. dollar) in the 1990s.32 Another measure could be GNP per 
capita, where Japanese incomes have likewise risen dramatically. From a fraction of the U.S. 
per capita income in the 1950s, the Japanese became richer than the Americans by the late 
1980s. The question is, did Japanese perceptions of and attitudes toward the United States 
change as the power relationship changed over time? And was there, therefore, a 
corresponding decline in amae expectations?33 
   Conveniently, Ambassador Kitamura has recently updated his thoughts about the 
psychological factors in U.S.-Japanese relations. He notes with satisfaction that Japan is now 
"a global economic power and a responsible member of the international community." 
      But sadly despite this rise in status, the Japanese still seem to harbor feelings of amae 
   toward America. Amae in the sense of expecting the United States to take care of us in 
   some way has gradually diminished since the 1970s. In recent years, however, we have 
   seen the emergence of amae in a different guise.34 
He thinks that failure on the part of the Japanese government to adopt definite domestic 
demand-expansion or market-opening policies to significantly reduce the unrealistically large 
balance-of-payments surplus is a kind of amae vis-a-vis America that allows the Japanese 
people to underestimate the seriousness of the issue. Even the sentimental satisfaction that is 
felt that Japan can say "No" seems to be linked to a kind of amae that assumes that America 
will reconsider. Kitamura notes that it is very difficult to overcome amae, since basically it 
derives from a wishful, unrealistic perspective. He hopes that Japan will share global 
responsibilities with the United States, and doing so will go a long way toward overcoming 
amae toward America.35 
    Yet, I was looking in vain for signs that may be Japan was getting to a position where 
she could dispense some amae to the United States. Unhappily, I think that Japan is essentially
1-279
comfortable receiving amae, and arguably Japan is still the weaker party in this relationship. 
But what happens when the power relationship is clearly in Japan's favor? Let us take, for 
example, Japanese behavior toward Korea and China from the last decade of the nineteenth 
century to the end of World War II. One looks in vain for a giving amae relationship. Quite to 
the contrary, Japan had displayed what I would call a counter-amae behavior. 
The Roots of Japanese Behavior 
   Why do the Japanese behave as they do? Most writers describe behavior without trying to 
explain the underlying roots. However, Professor John Graham and Mr. Yoshihiro Sano, in 
their book, Smart Bargaining.- Doing Business with the Japanese, do offer some explanations. 
They specificaly mention three environmental factors: (1) insular and mountanous geography, 
(2) dense population, and (3) the importance of rice.36 I would certainly accept these 
explanations, but perhaps would focus somewhat differently and stress additional factors. 
   I think the roots of Japanese behavior stem from: 
   (1) insular mentality (shima-guni konjo), isolation, homogeneity, national self-consciousness; 
(2) the pervading and related tribal cohesiveness termed Nihonkyo; (3) the prevalence of violent 
acts of Nature, leading to a sense of insecurity and vulnerability; (4) poor-man mentality which 
persists in spite of growing affluence; and (5) feelings of victimization (higaisha ishiki), orphan 
Japan. 
   Centuries of self-imposed isolation during the Tokugawa period, along with the 
geographical isolation of an insular nation, and a homogeneous population that had 
experienced centuries of feudal rule and fragmented loyalties have combined to produce a 
very powerful national self-consciousness and fierce subnational group loyalties. Proximity to the 
superior Chinese material and spiritual civilization and later the confrontation with advanced 
Western technology have necessarily affected the Japanese self-esteem. And what better way 
to counter such doubts than to stress the uniqueness of Japanese experience and culture. 
   Nihonkyo (Japanism) is a term used by the social critic Yamamoto Shichihei (mentioned 
above). He maintains that Nihonkyo so thoroughly permeates all aspects of Japanese life and 
personality that its followers are not even conscious of their adherence to its doctrine.37 The 
doctrine of Nihonkyo is a simple, indefinable system of concepts characterized by the worship 
of tradition, which is essential in the Japanese personality. The concept of Nihonkyo fits 
nicely with Robert Christopher's contention that "the Japanese people as a whole have only 
one absolutely immutable goal - to ensure the survival and maximum well-being of the 
tribe."38 I use the term Nihonkyo to denote the tribal cohesiveness of the Japanese. 
    Nature has not been generous to Japan. The country is not endowed with abundant 
natural resources, like Russia or the United States. Not only did Nature shortchange Japan, 
but it regularly unleashes destruction: typhoons, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tidal waves 
- the latter incidentally known in the world by the Japanese name tsunami.39 Being buffeted 
by the forces of nature for centuries is bound to produce a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. 
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On the positive side, these very liabilities have been amply compensated by the Japanese 
genius-like ability to adopt and, even more importantly, to adapt. 
   And in spite of growing affluence, I would venture the thought that the Japanese (at least 
the older and middle-age generations who have experienced the misery and destruction of war 
and early postwar deprivations) are afflicted with a persistent poor-man mentality (not unlike 
the Depression generation in the United States). One should note, in addition, that Japanese 
affluence is the affluence of the society, and not of individual middle-class Japanese, whose 
stardard of living is well below that of their counterparts in the United States and Western 
Europe.4o 
   The preceding two factors have combined to create feelings of victimization. Except for 
short periods, Japan was a weak country relative to its collosus neighbor China, and later 
relative to the great Western imperialist powers. Like Germany, Japan was a latecomer to 
industrialization and colonization and had to play catchup. The Japanese were discriminated 
against in the United States (California land ownership laws, U.S. Oriental exclusion act, 
removal and relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II) and it was on racial 
grounds. Then the atom bomb. Many Japanese are convinced that the bomb was not used on 
Germany, because Germany was a white nation and that dropping the bomb on Japan was 
racially motivated. (Never mind the reality that the bomb was tested over two months after 
Germany had surrendered.) Feelings of victimization were reinforced by the occupation of 
"Northern territories" b
y the Red Army at the end of the war and the exploitation of half a 
million Japanese prisoners-or-war in slave labor camps in Siberia. (Incidentally, the last two 
events of the war have conveniently transformed the Japanese in their eyes from aggressors to 
victims, but that is another matter.) The Nixon shocks, the oil shocks, Japan bashing, foreign 
pressure (gaiatsu), the list goes on. 
   These factors seem to explain Japanese negotiating behavior. My thoughts are offered in 
the hope that we better understand Japanese negotiating behavior, that Western negotiators 
can better adjust to negotiations with the Japanese, and that some of the insights presented in 
this paper might benefit Japanese negotiators in the future. 
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